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1 
New Governance Regulation and Lawyers: When Substantive 
Compliance Erodes Legal Professionalism 
 
Abstract 
A dominant theme within institutional theory is that organizational responses to regulatory 
demands will be characterised by decoupling. However, this assumption rests on regulation as 
a coercive force. The emergence of ‘new governance regulation’ and the freedom afforded to 
firms to tailor regulatory demands to local circumstances should, theoretically, foster greater 
commitment to, achievement of, regulatory goals. Focusing on the responses of solicitor 
practices in England and Wales to outcome-focused regulation, this paper explores the extent 
to which the flexibility of NGR triggers substantive compliance. Drawing on multiple data 
sources, we find that law firms made significant investments in compliance infrastructures and 
developed strategies to integrate compliance into work structures and day to day activities. 
Whilst their responses indicate substantive compliance, core regulatory goals were only 








The question of how organisations, such as professional services firms (PSFs), respond to 
complex forms of regulation and demands for accountability continues to provoke debate and 
controversy (Ramakrishna et al., 2017). Much of the extant literature draws on the notion of 
coercive isomorphism, emphasising regulated organizations’ limited autonomy (Raaijmakers 
et al., 2014), and loss of legitimacy when non-compliance is detected (Scherer et al., 2013). 
The dominant theme is that, despite increased risk of exposure of non-compliance (Marquis 
and Qian, 2014), organisations continue to sidestep (Quirke, 2013), resist (Desai, 2016) or 
comply superficially with regulatory demands (Bromley and Powell, 2012). However, with 
scholars finding that, under some conditions, organisations may respond substantively 
(Marquis and Qian, 2014), this assumption is open to question.  
This paper seeks to contribute to this debate by drawing attention to recent changes in 
the way professional services are regulated. Specifically, we focus on the emergence of a 
diverse range of regulatory instruments belonging to on overarching ‘family’ (Gilad, 2010: 
486) of ‘new governance’ regulation (NGR) (Ford, 2017). Central to NGR is the idea of moving 
away from ‘rules-based’ regulation towards a model which, affording firms the freedom to 
tailor regulatory demands to local circumstances, envisages a deeper commitment to, and 
achievement of, regulatory goals (Black 2012). As such, NGR calls into question the 
assumption that organisations will automatically engage in decoupling. On the contrary, the 
flexibility inherent in new regulatory instruments may incentivize organisations to develop 
compliance systems aligned with their own priorities (Meyer and Bromley, 2014).  
To explore this possibility, we focus on how solicitor practices in England and Wales 
have responded to the introduction of outcome-focused regulation (OFR) in 2011. Marking a 
new era of lawyer regulation, OFR stipulates the ethical and professional standards by which 
legal services are to be provided but leaves it to legal practices to determine how best to achieve 
3 
these. We pose two questions. First, to what extent has the flexibility implied by OFR triggered 
substantive compliance? Second, how has this process been negotiated and managed internally 
by firms?  
In what follows, we turn to the institutional literature first focusing on decoupling, 
before exploring the characteristics of NGR in more detail and its potential to elicit responses 
to regulatory demands that are substantive in nature. Details of the research setting and the 
qualitative nature of the research design are given next. In the empirical section of the paper, 
we identify the emergence of a compliance infrastructure, the integration of compliance 
systems and processes into firms’ core operations and day-to-day work routines and practices, 
and their alignment with commercial objectives. This is followed by a discussion as to the 
extent to which these responses equate to substantive compliance and how far regulatory goals 
are being realized.  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Decoupling  
Institutional theory has developed increasingly sophisticated models to understand how 
organisations respond to regulation. A central concept is ‘decoupling’, a process which occurs 
when pressure to comply with regulatory mandates conflicts with organizations’ primary 
purpose (Meyer and Rowen, 1977). The tension may be resolved by adopting one of two forms 
of decoupling assumes two forms: ‘policy–practice’ and ‘means–end’ (Bromley and Powell, 
2012). The former describes the symbolic adoption of policies without implementing the 
requisite practices (Bromley et al., 2013). As illustrated by the case of a large financial services 
firm (MacLean and Behnam, 2010), the latter entails symbolic implementation where elaborate 
structures and processes are established in response to external demands but their relationship 
with core tasks is ‘weak’ (Bromley and Powell, 2012: 3). Building on this distinction, research 
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has explored ‘the variables that predict or mediate’ instances of decoupling (Boxenbaum and 
Jonasson, 2017: 85). For example, decoupling is considered to be prevalent in complex or 
opaque fields where the multiplicity of practices increases ambiguity over how to achieve 
compliance (Wijen, 2014: 306). Ambiguity also increases the likelihood of organisations 
deploying decoupling as a strategy to accommodate the interests of multiple internal 
stakeholders (Meyer and Holler, 2016).  
However, organizations do not always engage in decoupling; substantive 
implementation is also possible. Here, regulatory mandates are aligned with the ‘task-related 
core of an organization’ in ways that ‘affect everyday decisions and actions’ (Weaver et al., 
1999: 540). This is most probable when the risks of detecting non-compliance are high and/or 
the consequences severe (Marquis and Qian, 2014; Chandler, 2014). Whilst this implies 
substantive implementation is involuntary and prompted by coercive forces, this may not 
always be the case. Crilly et al. (2012), for example, found instances of substantive compliance 
when organizations view this as a source of opportunity. Of the 17 firms in their study, five 
implemented corporate social responsibility obligations substantively because they viewed this 
is as a tool for generating business and accessing resources.  
‘Decoupling risk’ (Marquis and Qian, 2014) and ‘opportunity maximisation’ (Crilly et al., 
2012) are two conditions then which may encourage organizations to respond to regulatory 
demands substantively. But, is it possible that similar opportunities may be present in other 
situations? In particular, how relevant are ongoing changes in the nature of regulatory regimes 
such as those associated with NGR? We address this question next. 
New Governance Regulation  
Since the late 1990s, there has been a move to displace traditional forms of professional 
regulation with an alternative model, broadly defined as ‘new governance’ regulation (NGR) 
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(Carrigan and Coglianese, 2011). Although adoption of NGR techniques varies by professional 
domain and national jurisdiction, examples include principle-based regulation in UK financial 
services (Black, 2015), its adoption amongst regulators working to financial reporting 
standards set by the International Standards Accounting Board (Braun et al., 2015), 
‘management-based’ regulation directed at incorporated legal practices in Australia (Parker et 
al., 2010), risk-based regulation of UK physicians (Bostock and Hutter, 2008), and entity 
regulation of legal practices in Nova Scotia (Semple, 2017).    
In contrast to continental Europe (Lane et al. 2002), state involvement in professional 
regulation has been minimal in Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions. Professional bodies determined 
professional standards and deployed prescriptive regulation to govern practitioner conduct 
(Hadfield and Rhode, 2016). However, this model has been subject to considerable criticism 
in recent years for its failure to prevent professional misconduct (O’Regan and Killian, 2014). 
In the UK, for example, the Financial Services Authority attributed misspelling and other 
market misconducts to prescriptive regulation, asserting that the volume, complexity, detailed 
nature of regulatory rules diverted firm “attention towards adhering to the letter, rather than the 
purpose of our regulatory standards” (2007: 7). The assumption that prescriptive regulation no 
longer ‘fit(s) the realities of the new economy’ (cf. Lobel, 2012: 9) is a further driver 
encouraging the development of NGR. Typically, policymakers argue that in place of complex 
rules, regulation needs to be flexible, adaptable, and cost-effective (Ford, 2017). The burden 
on business must be minimal and the efficient operation of ‘self-correcting markets’ not 
thwarted (Armour et al., 2016). Compared with bright-line rules, new governance regulatory 
techniques are viewed as better able to meet these aspirations (Ford, 2008).   
Insert Table 1 here 
A common assumption underlying new governance regulatory instruments is that 
regulatory outcomes are more likely to be achieved when responsibility is delegated to 
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organizations for determining how to do so (Black et al., 2007). Regulatory outcomes may be 
achieved by ‘performance/principle’ or ‘process/management’ approaches (see Table 1 for 
more detail). Under the former, regulators establish service standards or high-level norms by 
which organizations are to undertake their activities. Process/management-oriented models 
seek to achieve regulatory goals by compelling organizations to construct management systems 
and processes that monitor the risks their operations pose to regulatory objectives and to put in 
place controls to mitigate (Carrigan and Coglianese, 2016). Whereas the latter techniques focus 
on the mode of regulation, entity regulation extends the target of regulation to encompass the 
firms in which practitioners operate (Dodek, 2011).  
Firm Responses to NGR: Coupling or Decoupling? 
Returning to the concerns raised earlier, it might be argued that NGR will reduce the 
likelihood of both policy-practice and means end decoupling (Bromley and Powell, 2012). The 
latter may be harder because in the absence of prescribed rules, organizations are forced to 
think through how to comply with the provisions of regulatory demands. As well as making it 
harder to game the system, this increases the prospect of organizations transcending ‘minimal 
compliance’ (Black, 2008). Under NGR then, the likelihood of means-end decoupling may be 
reduced by giving organisations the flexibility to develop compliance systems which satisfy 
external stake-holders and are aligned with their core business. However, there is also the 
possibility that closer relationships between organisations and regulatory agencies may result 
in co-productions of compliance (see Edelman and Talesh, 2011) and the prospect of regulatory 
capture (Black, 2008). 
Hence, emerging forms of NGR may, by their very design, limit the possibilities for 
decoupling and instead generate incentives for organisations to engage in more substantive 
forms of compliance. However, the possibility that ambiguity surrounding “appropriate” 
implementation’ (Parker et al., 2010) could just as easily lead to classic ‘avoidance’ strategies 
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should not be discounted. Thus, questions emerge as to how far NGR will trigger classic 
decoupling responses or substantive forms of compliance?   
STUDY CONTEXT: REGULATORY REFORM IN LEGAL SERVICES  
To explore the aforementioned issues, we focus on the example of NGR in the context of 
the solicitors’ profession in England &Wales where the regulator, the Solicitors Regulation 
Authority (SRA), combined three discrete new governance regulatory instruments: outcomes-
focused regulation (OFR), entity regulation and risk-based regulation.  
The solicitors’ profession is (broadly) bifurcated into two sub-fields: large firms advising 
corporate clients, and smaller, local and regional firms advising private clients. The genesis of 
OFR can be traced to the high volume of client complaints in the private client market and the 
failure of the Law Society to deal with these effectively. As complaints continued to rise and 
public confidence in the profession hit rock-bottom, pressure for reform intensified:    
People complain to ‘Which?’ time and again about the second-rate service 
they receive from solicitors, often during stressful times. Other professions 
can’t get away with this type of behaviour and it’s time for the Government 
to rein in this complaint-riddled industry (Director of Which? quoted in 
DCA, 2005: 21).  
The government responded by enacting the Legal Services Act, 2007 (LSA), which established 
a new framework for regulating legal services in E&W. The LSA places a duty on regulators 
to promote and help realize eight regulatory objectives. Whilst these reflect two ideologies – 
professionalism and consumerism (Boon, 2010; Semple, 2015) – the Act does not prioritize 
between the objectives – all assume equal weighting. Nor does it stipulate the instruments by 
which legal service providers are to be regulated; the decision to adopt NGR or continue with 
traditional methods is left to the regulators.   
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The SRA distilled the LSA’s eight regulatory objectives into two goals, which it identified 
to be the purpose of its regulatory role: (a) protecting the consumers of legal services and (b) 
ensuring that the lawyers and solicitor practices act in accordance with the professional 
principles set out in LSA (SRA, 2015). Guided by these, the SRA replaced rules-based 
regulation with OFR, entity regulation, and risk-based regulation.  
Outcome-focused regulation, entity regulation and risk-based regulation   
The SRA justified the introduction of OFR on two grounds. It believed OFR to be better 
suited to the liberalized market environment; its inherent flexibility would give ‘firms the 
freedom to innovate’ and support them to respond to competition from new providers. The 
second justification centred on the perceived limitations of prescriptive regulation for fostering 
a passive ethical culture and, correlatively, the purported strength of OFR to improve standards, 
protect client interests, and uphold the rule of law (SRA, 2009; 2015).  
OFR consolidates professional and regulatory requirements into a single handbook – the 
SRA Handbook. This includes ten, high-level principles, which express ‘the fundamental 
ethical and professional standards’ expected of practitioners and firms (SRA, 2010b). The 
Handbook also includes a series of mandatory outcomes, which define standards of service 
expected from providers and obligations owed to clients, the regulator, third parties. Further 
outcomes focus on effective and efficient management of the business (SRA, 2010).   
Firms’ mandatory appointment of compliance officers for legal practice (COLP) is the 
second feature of OFR. COLPs are responsible for ensuring management systems are in place 
for the firm and its employees to be able to comply with statutory obligations and the terms 
and conditions of their practices’ license to operate.   
To complement OFR, the SRA introduced entity regulation and changed its 
enforcement approach to risk-based regulation. The former extends the unit of regulation to 
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encompass firms whilst the latter directs SRA’s attention on issues and firms that it considers 
pose the greatest risk to achieving regulatory objectives (SRA, 2014).  
RESEARCH DESIGN  
We designed an inductive, qualitative study to explore organizational responses to OFR 
and drew on multiple data sources to investigate core research questions. First, documentary 
sources were used as a knowledge resource and a means of data triangulation (Bowen, 2009). 
Three types of documents were examined, each performing a different function. Our starting 
point was an analysis of OFR-specific documents (business plans, policy statements, 
consultations, guidance) produced by the SRA and LSB. These provided insights into 
regulators’ perceptions of the purpose of regulation and standards of conduct expected from 
practitioners and firms. We also studied decisions made by the LeO as a rough proxy for the 
level of complaints in each firm. Lastly, research commissioned by the SRA and others relating 
to firms’ experiences of regulation (e.g. SRA, 2013) was used to understand the implications 
of OFR. Analysis of archival material enhanced our credibility amongst informants (Harvey, 
2011), helping to improve the quality of interview data (see below).  
Our second data source comprised 24 semi-structured interviews with COLPs. These 
were staged over two periods: September to December 2013, and then January to March 2014. 
During the former, interviews were confined to COLPs in ABSs because we were interested in 
how their responses to OFR might be shaped by their non-traditional structure. In phase two 
we extended the sample to include COLPs operating in traditional law firms. All interviews 
were recorded and fully transcribed. In addition, discussions took place with senior officials at 
the SRA both before and after the main fieldwork. Follow up interviews were also conducted 
with four informants, bringing the total number of interviews to 29. Table 2 presents a summary 
profile of the study sample whilst Appendix 1 gives details of each firm.  
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[Insert Table 2 here] 
Given their centrality to the implementation of OFR, we chose COLPs as our primary 
informants. We sought to include the perspectives of other organizational actors but were 
denied access. Methodologically, a homogeneous sample such as ours presents limitations. 
However, we believe these to be offset (in part) by the openness of most informants (revealing 
anxieties, tensions and disagreements regarding implementation) and the seniority of 
respondents, most of whom were able to comment on wider strategies of their firms. We also 
discussed emergent findings in several forums organized by regulators (e.g. SRA, May 2016; 
International Bar Association, July 2016), allowing us to garner alternative views on the nature 
and practical impact of OFR. 
Turning to sampling, we sought to employ ‘heterogeneous’ (Robson, 2002) and ‘critical 
case’ (Patton, 1990) logics. The former aims to capture the diversity in a given population in 
terms of size, specialism, and geography (see Table 2), while the latter aims to include cases 
that are theoretically interesting. In the first phase interviewees were selected using the online 
register of ABSs maintained by the SRA. Of the total ABS population, which totalled 169 
entities at that time (August 2013), we identified a subset of 75 firms of interest, with 15 firms 
eventually agreeing to participate in the study. In this sample we included a mix of non-
traditional firms, some of which had not previously regulated by the SRA. In the second phase, 
the sampling frame comprised legal practices based in Yorkshire, mainly for practical reasons, 
although efforts were made to capture population diversity (for instance with regard to size). 
We contacted 30 firms and secured interviews with nine of them.  
In terms of interview content, we began by asking informants for background 
information on themselves and the firm. Open-ended questions were then used to explore how 
informants came to be appointed as their firm’s COLP, the changes they needed to make to 
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respond to OFR (if at all), any challenges they experienced in doing so, and the nature of their 
interaction with the SRA.  
As a third primary data source, we mined data from the internet, focusing specifically 
on firms’ websites both before and after interviewing. Pre-interview, a review of websites 
proved to useful for obtaining a historical narrative, although the type and level of information 
given varied greatly. Post-interview, we reviewed the websites against five indicators to 
ascertain what this may convey about firms’ approach to compliance/professional obligations. 
The five indicators included: the identification of COLPs, details of a complaint procedure, 
mission and/or values, and corporate social responsibility and other activities providing insight 
into how firms viewed compliance/professional duty.   
Data analysis involved a mix of deductive and inductive strategies: the deductive 
elements focused on categorizing aspects of the data in accordance with the literature on 
symbolic and substantive compliance. Content analysis and an adaptation of grounded theory 
analytical techniques (Gioia et al., 2011) were employed to identify theoretical dimensions 
addressing the research questions. Moving back and forth between the data and the literature, 
and facilitated by NVivo-10-software, our analysis unfolded over two stages.  
First, we sought to gauge the level of investment made by firms in their response to 
OFR and how this varied by firm size. This required us to code, segment and group data 
according to categories associated with the development of compliance functions (the COLP 
role) and management systems (including monitoring, risk management and formalisation). 
We used the ‘matrix coding’ function on NVivo to compare the responses by firm size.  
As per the study aims, our second issue of interest centred on ascertaining the degree 
to which enactment of OFR was symbolic (implying decoupling) or substantive (Weaver et al. 
1999). Here we undertook fine-grained analysis of the data to specify the discrete activities 
12 
associated with the implementation of OFR, whether they intended to buffer core operations or 
if they were being embedded into firms’ management systems and processes. We then sought 
to establish the mechanisms by which this occurred and classified the data into two ‘integration 
strategies’, the tactics by which firms sought to align OFR with their own goals. 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
The research findings are presented in two sections. The first details organizational 
responses to OFR and the emergence of a compliance infrastructure. The second explains ways 
in which firms sought to integrate compliance systems within work activities and their 
alignment with commercial objectives. 
Compliance Infrastructure: Continuities and New Functions 
Firms in this study did not perceive OFR as necessitating radical change. The new regime 
did not (for the most part) introduce a swathe of new professional and statutory obligations but 
imported these from the Solicitors Code of Conduct. Compliance processes in some shape and 
form were therefore already in place. Indeed, most informants stressed that OFR merely 
formalized practices already being undertaken by ‘well managed’ firms (LP23). Corporate law 
firms for whom sophisticated financial and management systems were viewed as essential for 
safeguarding their “professional reputation” (LP20) emphasized minimal change the most.  
Although the professional obligations under OFR did not change substantively, it 
introduced new mandates relating to business and risk management whilst entity regulation 
extended these requirements to firms. The study sample responded by establishing a 
compliance infrastructure.  
The Compliance Function 
Central to the establishment of a compliance infrastructure was the appointment of a COLP 
– practitioners registered with the SRA as formally accountable for ensuring processes are in 
13 
place to comply with the SRA Handbook. COLP appointments were made at senior levels with 
the role assigned to partners in all but four cases. This helped ensure compliance-related 
decisions would be acted upon and minimized potential resistance to new practices. Appointing 
those in leadership positions as the COLP was also a means by which firms signalled their 
commitment to compliance to external stakeholders (see below).  
Actors designated as the COLP did not always undertake the work associated with their 
role. In four firms (three large and one small) for instance, COLPs delegated day-to-day 
activities to others but retained responsibility for substantive decisions relating to compliance 
(e.g. how to interpret the Code of Conduct, when and if to report transgressions to the SRA). 
Contrastingly, COLPs in seven firms assumed responsibility for all compliance related 
activities but, in doing so, no longer had a fee-earning role. In a third group comprising small 
and medium-sized firms, COLPs combined compliance duties with fee-earning as it was 
neither economically viable nor necessary for the position to be full-time. 
The Development of Management Processes & Systems 
Introducing new management systems or modifying existing ones was a second feature of 
the compliance infrastructure established by study participants. Seeking accreditation from the 
Law Society’s quality assurance mark – Lexcel – was a principal means by which they did so. 
Indeed, at the time of fieldwork, half of the study sample (four small and eight large firms) had 
become Lexcel accredited or were working towards this. For firms, the primary appeal of using 
Lexcel is that it assembles the necessary guidance, checklists and other material in one place to 
comply with all aspects of OFR. Essentially, Lexcel accreditation offered a simple, one-step 
solution for having in place effective business management systems expected by the SRA and 
other processes and practices to comply with the demands of OFR.  
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Turning to file reviews, these constituted a prominent example of the change engendered 
by OFR. Under the new regulatory regime, the primary purpose of file reviews was to assess 
the extent to which fee-earners followed new compliance protocols, and whether the 
administrative tasks associated with case management had been undertaken. As file reviews 
form a critical component of the firm’s evidence base demonstrating compliance, extant 
processes were tightened and their frequency increased.  
Managing and mitigating risks is a further activity, not wholly new, but assuming greater 
importance under OFR. The data reveals four key aspects of risk management: (i) the formation 
of new structures such as the Governance and Risk Management Committee established by a 
practice in the North West specializing in personal injury; (ii) the development of new roles 
and posts – ‘Risk and Compliance Manager’ and ‘Director of Risk’ are two such examples; 
(iii) new procedures to identify, monitor and record levels of risk such as ‘risk registers’; (iv) 
modification of extant practices such as increased frequency of risk assessments.  
Monitoring/reducing complaints is another important example illustrating a modification 
of existing processes but, also organisational variation. The SRA uses data on complaints as 
one indicator to assess professional standards and the quality across the firm population. At 
firm level, excessive or unresolved complaints may trigger an investigation. Although 
complaint monitoring was not new under OFR, it had, reportedly, become more systematic and 
commanded a highish priority amongst firms operating in the private client market – certainly 
more than corporate law firms. Variation in the importance attached to complaints is reflected 
on firms’ websites. Of the eight providing details of a complaints procedure (see Table 2 in the 
Appendix), six operate in the high-complaint specialisms.  
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Documenting Compliance 
OFR is intended to move away from a ‘tick-box’ approach to compliance. From the 
perspective of the SRA, this requires organizations to demonstrate compliance (SRA, 2010d). 
This requirement is wide ranging, including file reviews, monitoring complaints, assessing 
risks, recording breaches with the Code of Conduct and even training plans. As such, 
informants stressed the need to evidence compliance as one of the biggest changes associated 
with OFR. The COLP at a national firm based in Yorkshire put it like this: 
There’s a lot of documentary evidence that the SRA require nowadays and I 
think they don’t realize how time-consuming it is.… [There’s] a lot of stuff 
that you have to do in the background all the time you know, if the SRA 
dropped in now, they’d want to see a risk register, they’d want to see a 
compliance plan.  They’d want to see your monthly COLP report, your 
internal breaches…(LP15).  
In addition to assessing the effectiveness of firm processes (e.g. via file reviews), COLPs keep 
a record of queries relating to regulation and how these were addressed. Firm decisions which 
raise regulatory issues are also recorded. Overall, informants stressed that maintaining an audit 
trail is one of the most significant and onerous aspects of OFR.  
Beyond (means-end) decoupling: Capitalizing Regulation   
This section details two strategies by which firms sought to integrate compliance across 
work structures and daily activities. One strategy focused on the business benefits of doing so 
whilst the other sought to meet regulatory demands without minimizing productivity.     
Framing and Rationalizing Compliance 
Resonating with findings from the wider regulatory literature, COLPs sought to justify the 
investment in compliance by connecting these systems with commercial goals in several ways. 
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First, they emphasized the damage to firm reputation and the financial costs of non-compliance. 
Whilst this included compensation, increased insurance premiums, and regulatory fines, a loss 
in future earnings was identified to be the most significant cost of all. In this regard, compliance 
was often equated with providing a quality service and/or meeting clients’ expectations. It is 
useful to give a quote from an international corporate law firm to illustrate that the commercial 
repercussions associated with non-compliance or poor service was an issue that firms of all 
types wished to avoid.   
We’re concerned about stuff we get wrong that costs us money, or has an 
impact on our reputation and we were monitoring that already [i.e. before 
OFR]… in firms of this ilk, complaints of poor service – we’re not a high 
street firm.…poor service is not something that happens. We’re in a very 
competitive environment where the majority of our clients are repeat 
clients…and obviously, they go off us if we get things wrong in terms of our 
service delivery…and either we rectify or we don’t get back on their panel 
next time round. There’s an economic/commercial outcome if we don’t get it 
right or meet the client’s expectations (LP20).  
The opportunity to enhance firm reputation was a further way in which COLPs sought to make 
the business case for compliance. As well as addressing demands of other external referents, 
specifically professional indemnity insurers and banks, compliance infrastructures signalled 
the practice to be ‘well managed’ and trustworthy. The knock-on benefits of being perceived 
as a ‘well-run’ business are captured by a managing partner of a regional firm:  
...the reason we’ve tightened up [management] practice and are addressing 
risk is because we need to be a well-run business because of the stakeholders. 
Our insurers need to know we’re well-run so it keeps the premiums…And 
then if you’re a decent-run firm you’re more likely to attract better staff.… 
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And if you’re a well-run firm and you’ve got a reputation in the town, you’re 
more likely to attract the clients direct as well. So it all fits together (LP14).  
For firms in this study, regulatory compliance helped establish a positive feedback loop, which 
supported firm success. 
The potential to improve operational control was the second way in which COLPs 
framed compliance as an opportunity. Described as ‘an early warning system’ by one 
respondent (LP19), monitoring complaints and undertaking file reviews often drew attention 
to potential issues that could become liabilities. Early detection enabled issue resolution and, 
importantly, prevented professional negligence claims and/or reduced complaints. File reviews 
were singled out for supporting financial management as they detected bad debt for example.  
Following on from this, the data shows that compliance systems provided new 
opportunities for managers to monitor professional work and, consciously or not, were being 
deployed to do so. For example, one informant discussed the practice of undertaking “flash 
audits”, that is, reviewing files notifying fee-earners in advance. Another explained that 
supervisors were using new IT system to gauge productivity without fee-earners even being 
aware of this: 
We’ve got a computerised case management system, so the supervisors can go 
into anybody’s files.…if they go in and see that there’s been no activity on this file for 
two months or something, well what’s going on there? (LP12).  
The data also revealed that professional practice was being monitored via compliance systems 
for two reasons: (i) to verify fee earners usage of compliance processes and systems to 
undertake the administrative aspect of their role; (ii) to gauge productivity and assess billing 
schedules were up to date. Notably, compliance systems were not being deployed to ascertain 
professional standards.   
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Integration without Disruption   
Whilst firms in the study sample wished to comply substantively with the demands of 
OFR, they were also keen to ensure that this did not impede realization of their core 
(commercial) goals and, in particular, fee-earner productivity. To reconcile these two 
potentially conflicting goals, firms invested in new technology or modified existing systems to 
automate work the administrative aspect of client engagement and case management processes. 
As the following respondent explains, case management software systems included automatic 
prompts to inform fee-earners of the administrative tasks they needed to undertake:   
So, for example, when a fee earner sets up a new matter for a new client, 
there’s certain things that they have to do, and as a result of doing that, that 
ticks quite a few of our [compliance] boxes. So not only do they have to send 
an engagement letter, but they also have to fill in a risk questionnaire, which 
asks for certain things… So everything comes up automatically…(LP5). 
By simplifying regulatory obligations to a checklist of activities, this made it easier for fee-
earners to comply with OFR and helped overcome perceptions of the new regime as ‘an 
obstacle to them doing their job’ (LP10).  
Designating COLPs as the firms’ principal agents for compliance was the second way in 
which firms sought to reconcile regulatory demands without adversely productivity. 
Specifically, firms did not expect fee-earners to have detailed knowledge of the Code of 
Conduct or keep up to date with changes to the Handbook. Regulatory developments were 
communicated on a ‘need to know’ basis so as not to detract fee-earners from billable work. 
Whilst this practice kept compliance systems aligned with core commercial objectives, a few 
informants suggested that there was a risk of fee-earners abdicating responsibility to COLPs 
19 
on how to apply professional principles to their work. An informant at international law firm 
put it like this: 
I think there’s a danger about outcome-focused regulation that the average 
lawyer is less aware of their ethical and regulatory duties. You see, when I 
was growing up as a lawyer, we all had our Handbook…Now … because we 
do centralise so much that the average lawyer probably doesn’t think about 
these things as much as they used to (LP23). 
The concern here was that by allowing firms to adapt compliance infrastructures in 
ways that suited them, OFR might be leading to the ‘in sourcing’ of professional 
obligations (Legal Futures, 2016). This risk was seen to be exacerbated by the 
complexity of professional conduct rules and the difficulties practitioners face in 
understanding what is required of them.  
DISCUSSION  
The research findings raise three critical questions: (i) what new practices did 
organizations adopt in response to NGR? (ii) to what extent do these constitute substantive 
compliance? (iii) is OFR realizing the consumer protection and legal professionalism goals 
envisioned in the LSA? The short response to these questions is that resourcing actors to 
undertake compliance, the integration of compliance systems into work structures and 
activities, and the auditing of compliance are developments triggered by OFR. When assessed 
against the theoretical concepts, organizational responses to the SRA’s regulatory strategy 
equate to substantive compliance. Despite this, LSA’s goals of consumer protection and legal 
professionalism have only partially been realized at best. OFR may have played a role in 
improving consumers’ experience of legal services, but the corporatist nature of the SRA’s 
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regulatory strategy (Boon, 2017) appears to be eroding legal professionalism. We elaborate on 
each of these responses. 
The research findings revealed that responses to OFR often augmented or formalized pre-
existing processes with large firms in particular, emphasizing management control systems 
were already in place. Nonetheless, several developments are triggered by the SRA’s 
regulatory strategy. This includes the financial resources devoted to compliance activities and, 
in particular, the role and function of the COLP. Whereas investment in IT comprise one off 
costs, resourcing the COLP role represents a sustained cost. OFR increased the frequency of, 
and systematized the processes by which activities such as file review or complaint monitoring 
were undertaken. Organizations were also institutionalizing new practices such as the 
maintenance of risk registers. Importantly, these developments highlight the impact of the 
combined demands of OFR and entity regulation. The risk of losing the license to operate helps 
explain ongoing reviews of compliance and management processes, and the emphasis placed 
on verifying fee-earner follow compliance protocols.  
Auditing compliance systems and maintaining records is new to OFR. Although legal 
practices have been given the freedom to tailor regulatory responses to suit the markets in 
which they operate, the wider accountability and transparency sensibility (Power, 1997) 
pervading professional services requires them to be ready for an SRA inspection at any point 
and demonstrate compliance protocols have been followed. This is different from rules-based 
regulation where the onus was on the regulator to demonstrate infractions.  
We contend that organizations responded substantively to the SRA’s regulatory strategy. 
The development of integration strategies which sought to link compliance systems to firms’ 
commercial objectives is arguably one of the clearest manifestations of substantive compliance.  
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Even though organizational responses to the SRA’s regulatory strategy may be 
characterized as substantive compliance, this has not contributed to substantive realization of 
the LSA’s goals of consumer protection and legal professionalism. The evidence suggests that 
whilst OFR may have played a role in improving consumers’ experience of legal services, the 
corporatist nature of the SRA’s regulatory strategy appears to be eroding legal professionalism.  
Taking the issue of consumer protection first whilst a direct comparison of data on lawyer 
default pre- and post-OFR is not possible (see Boon 2016a for discussion of methodological 
issues), the quantitative data is very positive. Thus, the number of ‘allegations upheld’ declined 
from over 1400 in 2007 to 400 in 2017 whilst the number of cases referred to the Solicitors’ 
Disciplinary Tribunal also declined, from 525 in 2007 to 117 in 2017 (SRA, 2018; Boon, 2017). 
Moreover, the Legal Ombudsman has suggested that, since the complaints it deals with are 
primarily of a ‘complex’ nature, this indicates that legal practices are better at addressing the 
more ‘straightforward’ issues (LeO, 2018: 8). However, Boon is sceptical as to whether the 
introduction of OFR is the main reason for the decline in lawyer default suggested by the SRA’s 
figures, stating, “it is difficult to believe that it [OFR] immediately and consistently led to a 
reduction of offences worthy of sanction” (2017: 6791). He puts forward three hypotheses to 
explain the positive statistics, which includes prosecuting fewer serious matters because of the 
difficulty in using the outcomes in the Code of Conduct in misconduct cases. Findings from 
research on consumers’ experience of legal services also question whether improvement in 
lawyer default is as extensive as that indicated by the SRA’s data. For instance, one study found 
that the majority of consumers making a complaint sought further redress from the SRA or 
LeO because of their dissatisfaction with law firms’ complaint-handling processes (London 
Economics, 2017). A separate study revealed that client care letters remain mostly ineffective 
at conveying the information consumers prioritize and, often written in a tone lacking empathy, 
22 
are a tangible expression of the “uneven relationship between legal services providers and their 
consumers” (Optimisa, 2016: 16).  
So what conclusion do we reach regarding the realization of the consumer protection goal 
under OFR? Our view is that, compared with the quality and standard of service consumers 
received in the years running up to the introduction of the LSA, their experience of accessing 
legal services has, on balance, improved. By introducing entity regulation and making 
organisations the primary target of enforcement (Boon, 2017), the SRA’s regulatory strategy 
appears to have improved the management of legal practices and possibly contributed to a 
decline in lawyer default numbers. Specifically, OFR may have helped reduce complaints 
preventable by appropriate office management systems. That being said, the possibility that 
better business management has occurred in anticipation of intensive competition following 
market liberalisation should not be discounted.  
Turning to the realization of the second regulatory goal, to recall, the LSA places a 
statutory duty on the regulated community to abide by the professional principles. These 
encapsulate the core elements of legal professionalism and require lawyers to uphold the rule 
of law and to act with independence and integrity. Put differently, they are duty-bound to ensure 
their professional judgements are independent of client pressure, the commercial interests of 
the firm, and self-interest (Dinovitzer et al., 2015). In this regard, a good barometer by which 
to assess realization of legal professionalism is to consider the extent to which corporate 
lawyers are better able to withstand client pressure following the introduction of OFR.  
Results from studies of corporate law firms and lawyers’ understanding of their 
professional obligations under the Code of Conduct are not positive. One study of lawyer-client 
relationships found practitioners’ understanding of the concept of independence to be ‘poor’ 
with some lawyers suggesting that they are not independent nor do clients expect them to be. 
This may be attributable to several reasons but the researchers drew attention to the “limitations 
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of definition of independence in the SRA Handbook,” which fails “to account for many of the 
complexities and nuances of independence in today’s large legal practices” (Coe and Vaughan, 
2015: 2). In other studies, lawyers drew on the standard conception of lawyering to distance 
themselves from professional and ethical obligations. Thus, described as ethnically 
minimalistic, lawyers in Moorhead and Hinchly’s study viewed client interests as pre-eminent 
and the public interest with a sense of ‘weariness’ (2015). Likewise, Vaughan and Oakley 
found corporate finance lawyers to be “disinterested and unconcerned about the ethics of what 
they and their clients were doing” (Vaughan and Oakley, 2016: 71). It is probable that corporate 
law firms in the aforementioned studies have in place sophisticated compliance and risk 
management systems that the SRA would regard as ‘compliant’. Accordingly, these studies 
serve to highlight that whilst firms’ systems and processes may be compliant, these do not 
counteract client power and a heightened ethos of commercialism. In short, complying 
substantively with the SRA’s regulatory strategy does not lead the realization of legal 
professionalism. How do we account for this? 
We attribute the disconnect between substantive compliance and the realization of legal 
professionalism to the corporatist nature of the SRA’s regulatory strategy (Boon, 2017). It is 
premised on the belief that effective business management (based on proper governance and 
robust financial and risk management principles) will contribute to client satisfaction, minimize 
liabilities, and foster resilience. As such, the focus is on organizations and their compliance 
with regulatory and statutory obligations. Conversely, the SRA’s strategy does not lay 
emphasis on fostering normative commitment to professional values and virtues as the basis of 
professional conduct. Indeed, the managerial rationality inherent within the SRA’s corporatist 
regulatory strategy reinforces a lawyering mentality “focused on commercial and managerial 
rationality rather than value rationality and ethical judgment” (Parker and Rostain, 2012: 2361).  
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CONCLUSION  
This study makes several contributions to the extant literature. Our study develops 
understanding of the antecedents of decoupling and coupling (Boxenbaum and Jonasson, 2017; 
Bromley and Powell, 2012) by focusing on the nature and form of regulation as a critical 
explanatory variable. A dominant theme within the institutional theory literature is that 
organizations respond to regulation by decoupling or, if their responses are substantive in 
nature, this is involuntary, driven by a fear of loss of legitimacy. Taking the solicitors’ 
profession in England and Wales as an illustrative example, this paper sought to assess whether 
the flexibility inherent within NGR overcomes these challenges and whether organizational 
responses are driven not by coercive pressure but a substantive commitment to regulatory 
goals. Findings show that, whilst changes in the nature of regulation may increase the 
likelihood of substantive change, economic and social motives (Parker and Nielsen, 2012) 
remain the primary drivers. Coercive isomorphism, therefore, still holds true.   
A related contribution is towards understandings of the internal management of 
regulation by organisations (in our case, law firms). Although there are now many studies 
focusing on the wider issue of institutional complexity (Wijen, 2014), ‘Empirical research on 
the regulatory compliance behaviour by firms is difficult and rare’ (Malesky and Taussig, 2017: 
1761). This study helps to develop understandings of this ‘compliance behaviour’ in two ways. 
First, is to highlight the importance of integration strategies.  According to Bromley and Powell 
(2012: 36) more research is needed on ‘bottom–up or bootstrapping practices, in which 
organizations relate external demands more directly to their daily activities’. The case of legal 
services highlights a range of possible ‘bootstrapping practices’ (see above) and also reveals 
multiple drivers for these practices. As we saw, in part they were motivated by a desire to align 
compliance work with the strategic priorities of firms, in turn made possible by the flexibility 
inherent in OFR. However, the need actively manage integration (through bootstrapping) was 
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also a response to the tensions generated by this regulation, especially those associated with 
increasing administrative costs. In our own case, rather than engage in decoupling or 
‘substitution’ (Okhmatovskiy and David, 12) firms sought to deal with these tensions through 
greater integration.  
Second, our analysis illustrates that substantive compliance does not guarantee the 
realization of regulatory goals. We found evidence to suggest that while firms had engaged 
substantively with the businesses management aspects of regulation, the goal of legal 
professionalism was being undermined. In part this was a result of the ‘integration strategies’, 
which sought to minimise disruption to fee earning solicitors. By centralising as much 
compliance work as possible in the hands of the COLP, law firms were arguably undermining 
the involvement of individual professionals. Framing ‘compliance’ in terms of management 
systems and risk management processes, may also undermine practitioners’ knowledge of the 
principles and rules of professional conduct and the ability to recognize ethical issues. As such, 
our findings chime with Misangi’s (2016) observation that regulatory demands may lead to a 
‘concurrence of couplings and de-couplings’. They also highlight the unintended consequences 
of integration or ‘bootstrapping’ practices. While these may align firm and regulatory goals in 
one domain, they may inadvertently exaggerate de-coupling in others.  
Of course, when drawing these conclusions, it is important to note certain caveats and 
directions for future research. As we have noted already (boundary conditions), it would be 
useful to explore further the possible impact of different approaches to NGR and how these 
play out in different professions, such as accounting or finance and national contexts. Future 
studies might also benefit from improved access to documentary date from firms and interviews 
with a wider range of stakeholders, including senior partners and practicing solicitors. 
Especially useful here would be to track firm practices over time to explore how firm level 
responses to regulation evolve and change. 
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Table 1: A Typology of Regulatory Instruments (adapted from Gilad, 2010).  
 Prescriptive  Performance/Principle-Oriented  Process/Management-Oriented  
Regulatory foci & nature of 
rules & standards 
Detailed specification of required actions Clear articulation of goals or outcomes  Specifications guiding analysis of risks 
org’zl operations pose to regulatory 
objectives 
Adaptability of rules & 
standards to individual 
circumstances 
Limited – rules are uniform and difficult to 
change 
High -– outcomes tailored to individual 
context  
High – systems and controls tailored to 
individual context  
Regulatees’ commitment & 
internalization of regulation 
Low – externally prescribed rules may be 
seen as unreasonable / irrelevant  
High – autonomy to determine how to 
achieve outcomes fosters buy-in 
High – autonomy to determine how to 
design systems fosters buy-in 
Regulatees’ ability to innovate 
and extract private gains 
Low – prescriptive rules leave little room 
for innovation 
High – setting outcomes enable innovation 
and flexibility 
High – setting outcomes enable innovation 
and flexibility 
Compliance determination  Adherence to detailed rules  
 
Achievement of outcomes  
 
Assessment of efficacy of plans to monitor 
& manage risk     
Enforcement style  Reactive to violations  
Deterrence, adversarial & punitive  
Proactive, emphasis on prevention  
Learning-oriented over punishment  
Proactive, emphasis on prevention  
Learning-oriented over punishment 
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Table 2: An Overview of the Study Sample  
Firm characteristic  
 
No in sample  
Business structure     
ABSs  13 
Non-ABSs  11 
Firm size as measured by 
number of solicitors  
Small (less than 10)  4 
Medium (11 to 80)  9 
Large (81 and over)  11 
Legal aid contract   2 
Practice area: Mainly [but 
not exclusively]  
Mainly private client  14 
Mainly commercial – inc. public and third sector  7 
Niche, boutique or specialist  3 
Location  
London 7 
Regional  17 




Appendix 1:  
Table 1: A Profile of Legal Practices   












LP 1 ABS London 1 SP 4 Specialist private client  
LP 2 ABS North West 1 26-80 34 National, private client  
LP 3 ABS London 1 11-25 14 
Boutique, high net worth individuals, 
litigation, dispute resolution  
LP 4 ABS North West 6 26-80 98 
Specialist corporate & commercial, general 
insurance. 
LP 5 ABS Midlands 7 5-10 175 Multidisciplinary  
LP 6  ABS South East 1 2 to 4 2 Private client, probate  
LP 7 ABS North West 1 5 to 0 80 
National, personal injury & claims 
management  
LP 8 ABS London 1 2 to 4 6 
Specialist, corporate & commercial, health & 
social care  
LP 9 ABS Yorkshire 13 26 to 80 106 National, comprehensive private client  
LP 10 ABS London 15 81 & over 315 National, comprehensive private client  
LP 11 ABS North West 9 5 to10 100 National, comprehensive private client  
LP 12 ABS London 4 SP 44 
National, commercial, private client, legal 
aid  
LP 13 ABS North West 2 2 to 4 25 Commercial, contentious & private client  
LP 14 Non-ABS Yorkshire 4 5 to 10 8 Regional, commercial & private client 
LP 15 Non-ABS Yorkshire 2 26 to 80 60 
National, corporate & commercial, private 
client 
LP 16 ABS North West 10 81 & over 480 
National, corporate & commercial, private 
client 
LP 17 Non-ABS Yorkshire 2 5 to 10 20 Local, private client 
LP 18 Non-ABS Yorkshire 11 11 to 25 64 Local, commercial & private client 
LP 19 ABS Midlands 7 81 & over 271 International, corporate 
LP 20 Non-ABS London 18 81 & over 1,070 International, corporate 
LP 21 Non-ABS Yorkshire 4 5 to 10 40 Local, commercial & private client 
LP 22 Non-ABS Yorkshire 1 81 & over 156 National, corporate & commercial  
LP 23 Non-ABS London 9 81 & over 977 International, corporate & commercial 
LP 24 Non-ABS Yorkshire 1 5 to 10 15 Local, specialist, criminal, legal aid  
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